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Appellants Beaver Creek Coal Company and Arco Coal
Sales Company (for convenience collectively referred to as
"Beaver Creek") respectfully submit this brief in reply to the
Brief filed on behalf of respondent Nevada Power Company
("NPC").
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
This lawsuit involves disputes between Beaver Creek
and Trail Mountain Coal Company ("Trail Mountain"), two coal
suppliers, and NPC, a coal consumer.

Trail Mountain and Beaver

Creek each sold coal to NPC under long-term contracts (the
"Trail Mountain-NPC Contract" and the "Beaver Creek-NPC
Contract", respectively).

In addition, Trail Mountain sold

coal to Beaver Creek under a long-term contract (the "Beaver
Creek-Trail Mountain Contract").

The coal sold under each of

those contracts was intended for use in the boilers at NPC's
Reid Gardner Station.
Trail Mountain filed this action against Beaver Creek
alleging that Beaver Creek breached the Beaver Creek-Trail
Mountain Contract by refusing to accept Trail Mountain coal.
Beaver Creek asserts that the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain
Contract was repudiated and terminated by Trail Mountain's
failure, after proper demand, to provide adequate assurance
that its coal would meet the contract's requirement that the
coal be satisfactory for use at NPC's Reid Gardner Station.
Beaver Creek contends that it reasonably demanded adequate

assurance from Trail Mountain based on NPC's representations
that Trail Mountain coal caused operating problems and,
therefore, was not satisfactory for use at the Reid Gardner
Station.
The issue presently before the Court arose when NPC
refused to produce to Beaver Creek transcripts of depositions
of NPC?s officers and employees taken by Trail Mountain in a
federal court action in which Trail Mountain alleged that NPC
had breached the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract.

Trail Mountain

Coal Co. v. Nevada Power Co., Civil No. C-84-0686G (the
"federal action").

NPC contends that the deposition

transcripts are the work product of its counsel.

Beaver Creek

has appealed from the District Court's order denying Beaver
Creek's motion to compel production of the deposition
transcripts.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS ARE RELEVANT
BECAUSE THIS ACTION AND THE FEDERAL ACTION
ARISE OUT OF THE SAME FACTS

Beaver Creek is seeking discovery of the transcripts
of the depositions taken in the federal action because Beaver
Creek believes that those deposition transcripts contain
information relevant to the dispute between the parties to this
action.

Beaver Creek's belief is based on the fact that both

this action and the federal action arise out of the same facts
and events.

NPC suggests in its Brief that this action and the
federal action are factually dissimilar.

NPC attempts to

distinguish the actions by arguing that at issue in the federal
action were the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract and the quality of
the Trail Mountain coal shipped under that contract, but not
the contract subject to this action.
argument is meritless.

NPC's Brief, p. 6.

NPCfs

In both the Complaint and Amended

Complaint filed in the federal action, Trail Mountain alleged
that the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract had been
breached.

Complaint 1111 46-49 (Appendix 1 to Beaver Creek's

Brief), Amended Complaint HH 50-52 (Appendix 3 to Beaver
Creek's Brief).

In addition, the facts and events on which

Trail Mountain's breach of contract claims are based are the
same in both actions.
The Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract expressly
stated that the coal to be sold by Trail Mountain to Beaver
Creek under that contract would be used by NPC.

Because of

that fact, the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract required
the coal supplied by Trail Mountain to be "satisfactory for use
in the coal-fired boilers at Nevada Power Company's Reid
Gardner Station."
In December 1983, NPC informed Beaver Creek that coal
supplied by Beaver Creek to NPC had caused operating problems

In the federal action pleadings Trail Mountain refers to
the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract as the "ARCO/NPC
Contract." Complaint H 12, Amended Complaint 11 15.

at the Reid Gardner Station.

NPC suggested that high sodium

oxide levels in the coal had caused the operating problems at
the Reid Gardner Station.

Independent analyses of Beaver Creek

coal demonstrated that it did not contain the levels of sodium
oxide found by NPC.
In March 1984, NPC determined that Trail Mountain coal
contained sodium oxide levels in excess of the maximum
permitted under the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract.

For that

reason, NPC claimed that Trail Mountain coal was not
satisfactory for use in its Reid Gardner Station.

By letter

dated March 20, 1984, NPC suspended deliveries under the Trail
Mountain-NPC Contract.

Later, NPC informed Trail Mountain that

if the quality problems were not resolved by August 1, 1984,
NPC would consider the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract to be
terminated.
NPC informed Beaver Creek that shipments of Trail
Mountain coal had been suspended by letter dated March 22,
1984.

Based on NPC's representations concerning the problems

it was having at the Reid Gardner Station and the high levels
of sodium oxide in Trail Mountain coal, Beaver Creek, pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-609, demanded adequate assurance from
Trail Mountain that its coal was satisfactory for use at NPC's
Reid Gardner Station as required by the Beaver Creek-Trail
Mountain Contract.
assurance.

Trail Mountain failed to provide adequate

Accordingly, as provided by Utah Code Ann.
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§ 70A-2-609(4), the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract was
repudiated and terminated by Trail Mountain's failure to
provide adequate assurance.
In August 1984, Trail Mountain initiated the federal
action against NPC, alleging that NPC had breached the Trail
Mountain-NPC Contract by terminating shipments of coal under
that contract.

In the course of that lawsuit, certain officers

and employees of NPC were deposed.

After the depositions were

taken, NPC moved to dismiss Trail Mountain's Complaint because
Trail Mountain had not joined in the action Atlantic Richfield
Company, an indispensable party.

Trail Mountain then amended

its Complaint to state claims against Atlantic Richfield
Company, the parent company of Beaver Creek and Arco. The
claims made by Trail Mountain against Atlantic Richfield
Company in the federal action are the same claims that are made
against Beaver Creek in this action.

The sole reason that

Trail Mountain's claims against Beaver Creek were not resolved
in the federal action is that Beaver Creek could not be made a
party to the federal action without destroying the basis for
federal jurisdiction.
There is no basis for NPC's claim that this action and
the federal action are dissimilar and that the deposition
testimony given by NPC's officers and employees in the federal
action is not relevant in this case.

In the federal action,

NPC claimed that it properly terminated the Trail Mountain-NPC

Contract because the Trail Mountain coal did not satisfy the
quality requirements of that contract and was not satisfactory
for use at NPC's Reid Gardner Station.

Beaver Creek demanded

adequate assurance from Trail Mountain based on NPC's
representations concerning the quality of Trail Mountain coal.
An important factual issue in both actions is whether the Trail
Mountain coal was satisfactory for use at NPC?s Reid Gardner
Station.

The parties and the court's time and resources will

be wasted if Beaver Creek is required to redepose each of the
NPC witnesses who testified at depositions taken in the federal
action concerning issues disputed in this action.
II.

DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS ARE NOT WORK PRODUCT

NPC cites Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct.
385 (1947), in support of the proposition that depositions are
protected work product.

The facts and analysis of Hickman

demonstrate that the Court's ruling in that case did not cover
depositions and cannot be construed to apply to deposition
transcripts.

Because deposition transcripts are not protected

by the work product privilege, Beaver Creek is entitled to
discover the deposition transcripts without demonstrating a
substantial need for the transcripts under Rule 26(b)(3), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
At issue in Hickman was whether a party could compel
an opponent to produce notes taken by the opponent's attorney
during interviews with potential witnesses.
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The Hickman Court

held that the notes were protected from discovery by a
privilege.

The privilege has become known as the work product

privilege.
The Hickman Court recognized the privilege in order
to create a "zone of privacy" in which an attorney can prepare
a client's case free from the intrusion of opponents.

The

notes at issue in Hickman were within the zone of privacy
because they contained the mental impressions of the attorney
who drafted them.

The Hickman Court reasoned that requiring

the notes to be produced would transform the attorney from an
officer of the court into an ordinary witness.

That result was

unacceptable because it undermined the adversary process on
which the American system of justice is premised.
The deposition procedure established by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure eliminates the threat to the adversary
process which concerned the Hickman Court.

Deposition

transcripts are verbatim records of testimony given by
witnesses.

The transcripts are prepared by an independent

officer of the court.

As a result, discovery of deposition

transcripts does not involve an involuntary disclosure of an
attorney's mental impressions or require the attorney to
testify concerning the deponent's statements.

Instead, the

deposition process established by the rules of civil procedure
creates a forum in which attorneys for opposing parties can and
are expected to exercise their adversarial skills on behalf of

their clients.

Thus, the Hickman analysis affords no

justification for extending the work product privilege to cover
deposition transcripts.
The inapplicability of the work product privilege to
deposition transcripts is demonstrated further by examining the
"work product" that NPC claims will be disclosed if the
deposition transcripts are ordered produced.
11.

NPCTs Brief, p.

NPC's claim that its attorney's preparation for the

deposition will be disclosed is wholly unfounded.

Nothing in

the nature of the deposition process requires an attorney to
disclose how the attorney prepared for the deposition.

If

NPC's attorney disclosed such information during the
depositions, he did so voluntarily and in the presence of an
adversary, thereby waiving any privilege.

The questions asked

during the deposition and the responses given by the witness
being deposed by Trail Mountain's attorney simply are not work
product of NPC's attorney, who was merely defending the
depositions.
Unlike an attorney's notes of a witness interview,
deposition transcripts do not evidence an attorney's private
preparation of a client's case.

Thus, there is no need to

exclude deposition transcripts from discovery to preserve the
zone of privacy that the Hickman Court recognized to protect
the adversary process.
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III. APPLYING THE WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE TO
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS WOULD BE FUTILE
BECAUSE WAIVER IS INHERENT IN THE
DEPOSITION CONTEXT
The purpose of the work product privilege is to create
a zone of privacy in which an attorney can prepare a client's
case without needless interference.

The deposition procedure

established by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is
incompatible with such a zone of privacy.

Opposing counsel

must be given reasonable notice of a deposition and an
opportunity to participate in the deposition.

Since any

disclosure made by an attorney during a deposition necessarily
waives any work product privilege because it is made in the
presence of an adversary, it would be pointless to apply the
work product privilege to deposition transcripts.
In its Brief, NPC sought to obscure this compelling
point by suggesting that Beaver Creek has confused the work
product and attorney-client privileges.
15-16.

NPC's Brief, pp.

To the contrary, NPC has misunderstood Beaver Creek's

argument and ignored the holdings of the cases it has cited.
"The purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect
information against opposing parties . . . ." United States v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).

At the time the depositions were taken, Trail

Mountain and NPC were opponents.

The presence of Trail

Mountain's counsel at the depositions results in a waiver of

any work product privilege because Trail Mountain was NPC?s
adversary in the federal action, not because of a lack of
confidentiality.
was its adversary.

NPC now seeks to ignore that Trail Mountain
The applicability of the work product

privilege cannot depend on something as capricious as NPC f s
perception of who its allies are.
IV.

RULE 32(a) ESTABLISHES THAT DEPOSITION
TRANSCRIPTS ARE DISCOVERABLE

NPC contends that Beaver Creek is precluded from
citing and relying on Rule 32(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, in this appeal because Rule 32(a) was not put before
the trial court.

NPC f s Brief, p. 21.

The cases cited by NPC

in support of this proposition demonstrate that the rule of
preclusion applies only to substantive theories of recovery or
defenses.

Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co., 723

P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1986) (estoppel defense); Bundy v. Century
Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984) (theory of
recovery).

Beaver Creek is not introducing a new theory by

citing Rule 32(a), but instead is merely citing additional
authority for its argument that deposition transcripts are not
covered by the work product privilege.

Beaver Creek took that

position before the trial court and continues to assert it in
this appeal.
NPC concedes that Rule 32(a) sets forth an evidentiary
standard for the use of depositions in court proceedings, but
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argues that the rule does not mean that deposition transcripts
are discoverable.
erroneous.

NPC's Brief, p. 22.

NPC's conclusion is

Rule 26(b)(1) expressly authorizes the discovery of

any matter that "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."

Since Rule 32(a)

establishes that deposition transcripts are admissible in
evidence, deposition transcripts must be discoverable under
Rule 26(b)(1).
NPC's argument that the deposition transcripts may be
introduced as evidence at trial, but that they are not
discoverable is nonsensical.

If Beaver Creek cannot obtain the

deposition transcripts through discovery, it certainly will not
be able to offer them as evidence under Rule 32(a).

The point

is not that privileged material, if obtained, may be introduced
as evidence.

Instead, the point is that deposition transcripts

by rule are admissible as evidence and thus are discoverable
under Rule 26(b)(1).
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS NOT ENTITLED TO
DEFERENCE

NPC contends that Judge Bunnell's ruling on Beaver
Creek's motion to compel is presumed to be correct and must be
affirmed unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion.
NPC's Brief, p. 10.

This standard of review is not applicable

in this instance because the issue on appeal is one of law, not
fact.

As to rulings on issues of law, the Supreme Court is not

bound by, nor required to give deference to, the trial court's
ruling.
The cases cited by NPC in support of its argument that
Beaver Creek must demonstrate that the order appealed from is
an abuse of discretion all fall within the general rule that
the decision of the trial court is entitled to deference only
on factual issues.

For example, in Tucker Realty, Inc. v.

Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), the issue appealed
was whether the sanction imposed by the trial court for a
party's failure to respond to an order compelling discovery was
appropriate.

Similarly, both Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d

162 (Utah 1981), and Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah
1974), addressed the adequacy of the evidence to support the
trial judges' rulings.

In such circumstances, deference to the

trial court's ruling makes great sense because the trial court
is better situated to assess matters of fact than is an
appellate court.
This appeal, however, does not involve a matter of
fact.

Instead, the question presented is whether the trial

court properly ruled as a matter of law that deposition
transcripts constitute work product.

A trial court has no

advantage relative to an appellate court in deciding questions
of law.

Thus, on questions of law, this Court is not bound by

or required to give deference to the trial court's ruling.
Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586 n.l (Utah 1982); Provo City
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1979).
-13-

In this appeal, Beaver Creek does not have the burden
of establishing that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of
discretion.

To the contrary, as the party asserting the

privilege, NPC bears the burden of demonstrating that an
exception to the liberal rules of discovery is applicable in
this instance.

Casson Construction Co. v. Armco Steel Corp.,

91 F.R.D. 376, 385 (D. Kan. 1980); Feldman v. Pioneer
Petroleum, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 86, 88 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
VI.

THE COURT MUST TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF THE FEDERAL COURT PLEADINGS

Beaver Creek has provided to the Court and requested
that the Court take judicial notice of certain pleadings and
other documents filed by Trail Mountain and NPC in the federal
action.

Beaver Creek is not asking the Court to accept as true

the allegations contained in those documents, but only to
accept as true that the allegations were made. These
allegations frame the factual events relevant to the federal
action, which are the same as in this matter.

This similarity

is one reason that Beaver Creek seeks copies of the transcripts
of the depositions taken in the federal action.
To support its claim that the pleadings and documents
filed in the federal action are not properly subject to
judicial notice, NPC relies on 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 58
(1967).

Although a superficial reading of the section may

suggest support for NPCfs contention, a thorough review of the

section reveals that it is not even relevant to the issue of
judicial notice in this case.

The section NPC cites applies to

instances where courts are asked to take judicial notice of the
proceeding or record in another case "to supply, without the
formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to the
support of the particular cause before the court."

Even if the

rule stated in American Jurisprudence is correct, it is not
applicable to this matter.

The pleadings and documents filed

in the federal action do not prove a fact essential to Beaver
Creek's claims.

Instead, those documents merely assist this

Court in understanding the factual relationship between the two
actions, which demonstrates that the deposition transcripts
from the federal action are relevant to this action.
The scope and reach of judicial notice has been
expanded over the years.

St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th
Cir. 1979).

Contrary to the suggestion of NPC, judicial notice

now is routinely taken of pleadings and documents filed in
other actions.

1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's

Evidence IT 201 [03], p. 201-29 (1986) ("Courts are particularly
apt to take notice of material in court files"); 21 C. Wright &
K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5106, p. 505 (1977)
("The most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable
facts is in noticing the content of court records").

This

Court recognized in Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah
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1977), that "notice may be taken of the record of another
case," as long as the court states it has done so, or,
alternatively, the matter is offered into evidence. Accord,
Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir.), cert, denied,
461 U.S. 960, 103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983) ("federal courts may also
take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts, both
within and outside of the federal judicial system. . . . " ) ;
Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., 667 F.2d 958, 961 n.8
(11th Cir. 1982); St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979);
Sapp v. Wong, 3 Haw. App. 509, 654 P.2d 883, 885-86 n.3
(1982).

As these cases demonstrate, courts will take judicial

notice of judicial proceedings, even those pending in another
court.
NPC also argues that the failure of Beaver Creek to
seek judicial notice of the documents from the federal action
before the lower court precludes Beaver Creek from doing so in
this Court.

NPC relies on Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692

P.2d 754 (Utah 1984); and Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 1986).

NPC's Brief, p. 20. Those

cases stand for the accepted rule that a litigant is precluded
from raising new substantive theories on appeal. Beaver Creek
is not raising a new theory, but merely submitting information
which will assist this Court in understanding the similarity
between this action and the federal action. Moreover, Rule

201, Utah Rules of Evidence, permits judicial notice of a fact
to be taken for the first time on appeal.

Rule 201(f), Utah

Committee Note (noting that Utah adopted the federal rule
verbatim); Rule 201, Federal Rules of Evidence and Advisory
Committee Note on Subdivision (f); accord, Gustafson v.
Cornelius Co., 724 F.2d 75, 79 (8th Cir. 1983) ("An appellate
court may take judicial notice of a fact for the first time on
appeal."); Coney v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir.
1984); Green v. Warden, supra; Rothenberg v. Security
Management Co., supra; Moore v. Estelle, 526 F,2d 690, 694
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976); 1 J. Weinstein
& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence U 201 [06] (1986).
The provisions of Rule 201 are clear, and under the
rule the pleadings and documents filed in the federal action
are properly subject to judicial notice by this Court.

Rule

201(b)(2), defines a fact that may be judicially noticed as one
that is "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
The documents provided by Beaver Creek were obtained from the
file maintained by the Clerk of the Court for the United States
District Court for the District of Utah.

Beaver Creek submits

that the Clerk of the Court of the United States District Court
for the District of Utah is a source whose accuracy cannot be
reasonably questioned and from whom the accuracy of the
documents may be determined accurately and readily.
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Further,

NPC, which executed some of the documents through counsel, does
not raise any issue as to the authenticity or accuracy of the
documents.

Under these circumstances, Rule 201(d) requires

this Court to take judicial notice of the documents filed in
the federal action and the fact that certain allegations were
made in those documents.

In re Ronwin, 139 Ariz. 576, 680

P.2d 107, 111 n.4 (1983).
Due to the fact that in their briefs and memoranda to
this Court, Beaver Creek and NPC have characterized the
relationship between the federal action and this action
differently,

e.g., Issue No. 2, Answer of Nevada Power

Company in Opposition to Petition for Permission to Appeal, p.
5; NPC Brief, p. 6, there also are two compelling pragmatic
reasons for the Court to take judicial notice of the documents
from the federal action.

First, these documents will enable

the Court to understand the factual context in which the issue
before it arose.

Second, by taking judicial notice of the

documents submitted by Beaver Creek, the Court can make its own
determination as to the similarity of the facts at issue in the
two cases, as opposed to relying on the unsupported contentions
of the parties.

In taking judicial notice of a complaint filed

in a state court action, the court in E. I. DuPont De Nemours &
Co. v. Cullen, 791 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1986), stated that:
We recognize that no one has formally placed the
complaint in the record of this case. Yet, we
see no reason to continue playing Hamlet without

the prince. Nor do we believe it desirable to
treat the complaint like Hamlet's father's ghost
-- exerting an unseen yet controlling influence
from the limbo of the appendix to the trustee's
district court brief.
791 F.2d at 7.

This Court likewise should take judicial notice

of the pleadings and documents filed in the federal action.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The District Court erred in ruling that transcripts of
depositions taken by Trail Mountain of officers and employees
of NPC in the federal action which contain testimony concerning
the factual circumstances out of which this action arose are
not discoverable by Beaver Creek.

Deposition transcripts are

admissible in evidence at trial. As such, they are within the
scope of discovery established by Rule 26(b)(1).

Deposition

transcripts are not subject to the work product doctrine.
Accordingly, Beaver Creek is entitled to discovery of the
deposition transcripts without making a showing of need.

The

District Court's order must be reversed and an order entered
compelling NPC to produce the deposition transcripts to Beaver
Creek.
DATED this ^<H~day of July, 1987.
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